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Abstract 
 
This paper approaches the subject of labour standards from the standpoint of domestic 
labour market circumstances rather than international norms. The paper assesses 
government approaches to improving standards in the context of Indonesia’s daunting 
‘employment challenge’, and the capacity of institutions to implement reform since the 
fall of Soeharto. The discussion of recent reforms is divided into two parts: the 
affirmation of basic rights and freedoms, and legislation for the protection ‘Survival’ and 
‘Security’ Rights. We find that while the protection of labour freedoms is long overdue, 
there is mounting evidence that regulation of setting labour standards in the modern 
sector benefits the few with ‘better’ jobs. It penalises many less fortunate Indonesians in 
the informal sector and agriculture, and also younger, new job seekers.  Owing to a 
significant improvement in Basic and Civil Rights, the compliance regime in relation to 
labour standards has altered dramatically in recent years. This has closed the gap between 
rhetoric and reality: between formal ratification and the actual impact of labour 
regulations on labour costs, while giving no obvious boost to productivity. It is of 
concern especially in those internationally labour-intensive industries such as textiles 
footwear and clothing TCF, where Indonesia has had a comparative advantage in the 
past. 
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LEGISLATING FOR LABOUR PROTECTION: BETTING ON THE 
WEAK OR THE STRONG?1
 
Chris Manning 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the spread of with globalisation, there has been considerable attention on labour 
standards in poor countries.  Inadequate standards have been highlighted in the context of 
charges of ‘unfair’ trade advantages gained by some Third World countries, in part 
through the ‘exploitation’ of hapless workers by multinationals.2  Whether in pursuit of a 
protectionist or humanitarian cause, threats of trade and consumer boycotts are frequently 
linked to the failure of companies or countries to meet minimum absolute standards, the 
benchmark for which is often set in more developed countries.3
 
In this chapter we approach the subject of labour standards in a quite poor developing 
country, Indonesia, from a different perspective.  Labour standards are assessed primarily 
from the standpoint of domestic labour market circumstances rather than international 
norms.  We examine several aspects of labour standards from a broad perspective of 
basic, civil, survival and security rights.  Minimum wages, the rate and principles 
regulating severance pay, and clauses legislation in dealing with contract labour were the 
main policy issues in the Indonesian context in 2003-2004.  We assess government 
approaches to improving these standards in the context of Indonesia’s daunting 
‘employment challenge’: providing more productive and better paying jobs for over half 
the work force in low paid, informal and marginal jobs, as well as for new job seekers.   
 
Under Soeharto, Indonesia was in the international spotlight for abuse of rights and 
standards.  At the same time, it was a country where the take-off in export-oriented 
manufacturing had a significant impact on employment and wages in the modern sector 
(Manning, 1998).  Since the fall of Soeharto, enormous changes have occurred in the 
regulatory environment, with regard to both rights and standards.  Three major acts were 
                                                 
1  The author is Head of the Indonesia Project, Division of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
the Australian National University.  Ideas for this paper were first discussed at the Indonesian Study Group 
at the Australian National University in August 2003 and an earlier draft of the paper presented at the Asian 
Studies Association of Australia Annual Conference in Canberra in July 2004.  The author wishes to thank 
participants at both seminars for comments and particularly Dr. Kelly Bird who has contributed to several 
of the ideas discussed.  The usual disclaimers apply with regard to responsibility for material contained in 
the paper. 
2  For two alternative views on subject by well known economists, see for example Rodrik (1996), in 
favour of greater international efforts to regulate standards, and Bhagwati (2004) strongly against such 
actions, especially if they are linked to trade access.  For general treatments see Moran (2002) and Elliot 
and Freeman (2003). 
3  By far the greatest attention in both professional literature and advocacy has been focused on the 
employment of child labour as both morally repugnant and a key element of the unfair advantage held by 
Third World countries, even though the issue is of minor significance in terms of employment or abuse of 
rights in many countries. 
passed by parliament in 2000-2004, and Indonesia has ratified all core ILO conventions.  
At the same time, labour market circumstances have worsened.  Economic growth has 
slowed and export industries struggled in a less favourable domestic and international 
environment for business (Van der Eng and Basri, 2004). 
 
It is useful to think of these reforms as occurring in two stages in the post Soeharto 
period: reforms that deal mostly with labour freedoms and rights, and those that cover 
material standards and welfare.  We look at the interaction of each of these developments 
with employment and wages.  It is argued that protection of labour freedoms is long 
overdue.  However, while legislation setting labour standards rigidly in the modern sector 
benefits the few with better jobs, it has the potential to penalise many less fortunate 
Indonesians.   
 
Section 2 of the paper asks how we might usefully define of labour standards for 
analytical purposes.  It examines issues of implementation capacity and institutions, and 
the nature of the relationship between economic structure and growth, on the one hand, 
and labour standards on the other.  We then look briefly at the economic and labour 
market context in which labour reforms have been pursued in the post-Soeharto era.  In 
sections IV and V, the main part of the paper, the discussion of recent reforms is divided 
into two parts: the affirmation of basic rights and freedoms, and legislation for the 
protection ‘Survival’ and ‘Security’ Rights in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto. 
 
 
II. LABOUR STANDARDS AND EMPLOYMENT: GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The delineation of the boundaries between labour standards and basic rights, as well as 
the relationship of both to employment, earnings and labour welfare is both complicated 
and difficult to test empirically.  The discussion first draws attention to several of these 
issues.  In addition, we set the stage for a discussion of the Indonesian case by looking 
briefly at the range of instruments and institutions that are important for setting standards, 
and how they might relate to economic structure and growth. 
 
Defining Labour Standards and Rights  
 
First, how might we usefully define labour standards and distinguish them from basic 
rights?  Among the various classifications, we have adapted the typology developed by 
Singh  (2003: 111).4  Drawing on the work of several other authors, Singh suggests four 
broad groups all of which he terms as ‘rights’: Basic Rights, Civic Rights, Survival 
Rights and Security Rights (Table 1).  The first group consists of basic standards or 
fundamental rights.  Most observers agree that all should be incorporated in labour laws, 
even if precise definition and implementation is problematic: freedom from forced labour 
and coercion, abolition of child labour and non-discrimination in hiring, firing and 
remuneration.  The second, civic rights, related to rights of collective bargaining and 
                                                 
4  An alternative grouping is “core” and “cash” standards (Elliot and Freeman, 2003: 11). 
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action, and expression of grievances, are also regarded by many as fundamental to 
modern labour codes. 
 
These two groups together constitute, with minor differences, what ILO refers to as core 
labour rights, that should be enshrined in national laws and open to monitoring by 
national and international bodies (ILO, 2000).  Importantly for our later discussion of 
Indonesia, affirmation of these two sets of rights has little direct relationship to labour 
costs. 
 
The third and fourth group, Security and Survival Rights, “relate to conditions of work 
that affect workers well being, but do not necessarily directly affect freedom of choice” 
(Singh, 2003: 110).5  Survival Rights are most problematic in that they are not always 
covered in labour codes and may vary significantly according to levels of development.  
The fourth group termed Security Rights are typically covered in national legislation, 
dealing with rights against arbitrary dismissal, retirement and separation payments 
(severance pay) and survivors’ compensation.6 The most obvious example is the level of 
wages or compensation, which increases with economic progress (World Bank, 1995).7
 
Implementation and Institutions 
 
A second issue relates to the mechanisms for setting standards either in place of or in 
addition to government legislation, and what institutions tend to facilitate or, 
alternatively, to hinder the setting of socially acceptable standards?  Aside from 
regulation of basic standards, some countries such as the USA set many labour standards 
through collective bargaining at the establishment level, rather than through legislation.  
This results in much greater variation in labour standards across firms and industries, in 
accordance with the economic and labour market conditions.  In contrast, many European 
countries (and especially in Scandinavia) have legislated many of the basic standards 
mentioned above, or allow them to be set through centralised collective bargaining 
processes.8  The latter centralised bargaining and arbitration system has historically been 
a key feature of setting labour standards in Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Legislation by national governments has been by far the dominant mode for regulation of 
labour standards in Third World countries, including East Asia (Nayyar, 1995; Lee, 
                                                 
5  In some discussions the distinction is often made between process and outcomes, where process relates to 
basic freedoms or rights and outcomes to standards which correspond to a given level or pattern of 
development. 
6  We have added severance pay to the list of standards compiled by Singh, as comprising Survival Rights. 
7  Although to this author’s knowledge there has not been systematic research on the subject, there also 
appears to be a clear (positive) relationship between the level and form of several other labour standards 
(hours of work, amounts of accident compensation and health and safety conditions, and a country’s stage 
of economic development). 
8  See especially Engerman (2003) and Moene and Wallerstein (2003) on the origins of present labour 
standards legislation in the USA and Scandinavia, respectively.  Historically, those standards regulated by 
government have tended to be the responsibility of the central authorities.  The USA is again an exception, 
where the setting of basic labour standards has been under the jurisdiction of state governments.  More 
recently, regional governments in some developing countries such as the Philippines, have begun to assume 
responsibility for minimum wage regulation. 
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1996).  Other channels for regulation of labour standards have emerged in recent years, 
although their application is still limited to small groups of consumers and multinational 
corporations.  These include certification of sub-contracting arrangements by large 
multinationals such as Nike and compliance labelling by first world consumer groups 
who seek to restrict the imports of goods produced in low wage and ‘exploitative’ 
settings (Golub, 1997; Moran, 2002).  The ILO has played a more active role in 
disseminating information and advising on policy in recent times.9  But international 
efforts to enforce of labour standards have had limited success, and country proposals 
that have sought to utilise the World Trade Organisation to impose better labour 
standards have fared little better.10
 
Political and legal institutions play an important role in supporting the implementation of 
standards.  Countries with democratic traditions or newly established democratic systems 
of government have tended to give greater reign to trade unions.  In the Asia-Pacific 
region, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan are outstanding examples, all of which 
have experienced greater labour freedoms after democratic reforms in the 1980s.  Legal 
institutions also play an important role in dispute settlement (even if excessive litigation 
in countries like the Philippines can hamper resolution of labour disputes). 
 
At the same time, implementation of the national labour labour code is a problem in 
several Asian countries (Hutchison and Brown, 2001).  Autocratic governments and 
security organisations that override the rule of law, either though direct intervention or 
indirect mechanisms, have been able to neutralise labour protests and trade union action.  
In addition, an underpaid bureaucracy is likely to support extensive regulation often to 
the detriment of both employers and workers: local officials accept bribes in return for 
turning a blind eye to labour law transgressions, thus raising the cost to business and 
penalising employment. 
 
The Importance of Economic Structure and Growth 
 
Before turning to the Indonesian case, we look briefly at some general dimensions of the 
interaction between economic structure and growth, and labour standards. This is of some 
relevance to Indonesia, bearing in mind that the country experienced rapid economic 
growth and structural change in three decades before the Asian economic crisis, but has 
suffered a major turnabout in fortunes since. 
 
Three points are relevant.  First, with regard to economic structure, less open trade and 
investment regimes (often associated with both more dualistic economic structure), have 
tended to be associated with greater protection of modern sector workers through labour 
legislation.  It is no accident that the most protective labour codes have been in countries 
where the modern sector has been insulated from international competition, such as in 
                                                 
9  See Elliot and Freeman (2003: Chapter 5). 
10  Moran (2002: 103) notes that the ILO has only been successful in recommending a cut in international 
links with one country, Myanmar (over the issue of forced labour).  Elliot and Freeman (2003: 116-119) 
discuss the role of the ILO in helping implement the US-Cambodian Textile and Apparel Agreement, 
although they do not assess the potential effects of a new minimum wage regime on employment. 
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much of Latin America, and also in India in Asia.11  At the same time, the pressures to 
protect workers in modern sectors outside enclave industries are likely to be particularly 
intense in protected economies, and also resource rich yet labour abundant countries like 
Indonesia.  In such economies, the gap in wages between the capital-intensive, enclave 
modern sectors, and the rest of the economy tends to be large.  This leads to upward 
pressure on wages through regulation, or collective bargaining, in other less protected 
modern sectors, and especially in large export-oriented and labour-intensive, 
manufacturing plants (Berg, 1969; Manning, 1998).  Under such circumstances, jobs are 
likely to be lost and employment growth slow. 
 
Second, the rate of economic growth and employment expansion is also important for 
labour standards.  Worker demands for protection are likely to be greater in relatively 
stagnant than in rapidly growing industries, regions and countries.  Witness the calls for 
protection of standards in declining industries such as textiles, footwear and garments in 
developing countries, or the persistently high level of protection afforded to workers in 
the slow growing modern sector in India over many decades.  Similarly, calls for labour 
protection from developed countries through international trade sanctions have been most 
strident in support of sunset industries such as garments, that are most threatened by 
imports from developing countries. 
 
As Srinivasan (2003: 183) has rightly noted, “Many types of labour standards such as 
caste discrimination [in the case of India] in employment and wages tend to disappear in 
a tight labour market and with urbanization, both of which are associated with rapidly 
growing economies.”  Similarly, he notes (page 184) that issues of child labour have 
received most attention in countries like India and Pakistan where slow employment 
growth in the modern sector has denied parents access to better and more stable jobs, and 
low levels of education have offered children little alternative to work.  We shall see that 
slow growth, in particular, would seem to feature strongly in the call for greater 
protection of workers in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto period, notwithstanding the 
greater pressure for worker rights associated with more democratic processes.  
 
Third, with regard to trade reform, liberalisation has been opposed, especially by 
protected workers fearful of loosing their jobs.  And complaints among both domestic 
and foreign NGOs and labour groups about labour exploitation have been strongest with 
regard to wages, working conditions and labour rights in newly emerging the export 
industries, where employment growth has tended to be most rapid.  Some of these 
complaints are well justified where foreign direct investors have lobbied to undermine 
labour laws, especially in the case of rights to form trade unions and strike in export 
processing zones.12  But the weight of evidence suggests that even in the labour-intensive 
garment and footwear industries, wages have tended to be at least as high (and to rise 
                                                 
11  See especially Cox-Edwards (1997). 
12  Moran (2002: 59-60) documents specific cases of such lobbying in the Philippines and the Dominican 
Republic 
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more quickly) in foreign firms and their sub-contracting agents than in many other 
industries, and especially compared with smaller scale firms.13
 
To sum up, a wide range of labour standards are regulated in national labour legislation in 
most developing countries.  This has been the main mechanism for setting standards in 
environments where labour unions are weak, and where excess demand exists for jobs in 
the modern sector.  The impact of labour standards on employment depends in part on the 
economic structure and the rate and pattern of economic growth.  The need for, and 
advocacy of, extensive protection for workers is likely to be less pressing in rapidly than 
in slow growing economies.  But we have suggested that trade and economic growth are 
not always “complementary” with labour standards.14
 
As noted in the introduction, there have two waves of labour legislation in Indonesia 
since the Soeharto era.  First was affirmation of basic labour rights and freedoms 
culminating in a Trade Union Act (Undang-Undang) in 2000 and, second, efforts to 
improve labour standards culminating in the passing of the Manpower Protection Act of 
2003.15  We trace the main elements of reform in both labour rights and standards, and 
their relationship to employment and wages in sections IV and V of the paper, drawing 
attention to parallels and contrasts with labour standards and rights and their 
implementation before the downfall of President Soeharto in 1998.  First, however, it is 
necessary to look at the labour market context which changed dramatically during the 
economic crisis year of 1998, and has remained much less favourable than in the 
Soeharto period. 
 
 
III. THE ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET CONTEXT 
 
Three features of the Indonesian labour market are important in helping interpret the 
implications of recent changes in labour legislation and their implementation in 
Indonesia.  With a GDP per capita of around $600-700 in 2002-2003, it is still a low 
income country (World Bank classification).  The economy and the structure of 
employment display the features of an under-developed country.  GDP per capita is well 
below that of middle income countries such as Thailand and Malaysia in Southeast Asia.  
Low productivity agriculture and services still played a major role in the economy, and 
are of even greater importance for employment (Table 2).  A small proportion of both 
agricultural and non-agricultural workers are employed as wage employees, and hence 
                                                 
13  See especially Rama (2001: 14-18) on the effects of globalisation on employment, wages and equity.  
Moran (2002) has marshalled impressive evidence on wages and working conditions among FDI firms and 
their sub-contractors, drawing attention to the substantially improved working conditions and skill levels in 
EPZs that have begun to shift into higher-tech industries. 
14  This is notwithstanding Elliot and Freeman’s (2003: 139) more optimistic description of the relationship 
at the end of their informative book: “Globalization and labor standards are not mortal enemies but 
complementary ways – Siamese twins, in our analogy – to make modern economic growth work better for 
all.” 
15  The Basic Laws were No. 21, 200 and No. 13, 2003 respectively.  A further Act governing dispute 
resolution was passed by the parliament in early 2004. 
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potentially affected by labour regulations, although many are not covered in practice.16  
While not a particularly useful indicator of short or longer term labour market imbalance, 
unemployment rates (around 10%) were quite high by Third World and regional 
standards.17. 
 
Second, as in other countries, wages and labour productivity are very much higher in the 
formal sector: in manufacturing, for example, average wages were several times higher in 
large and medium than in small enterprises, even before minimum standards legislation 
began to be implemented more intensively in recent years.  Differences in value added 
per worker were of a similar magnitude (Table 3).18  Moreover, of relevance to our later 
discussion of minimum wages policy, wages per worker rose faster in the modern sector, 
despite slow employment growth, after the economic crisis in 1998. 
 
This large absolute difference in earnings is of direct significance to discussion of the 
impact of labour market regulation on the welfare of workers.  More rapid expansion of 
the formal sector offers major opportunities for better jobs among informal sector 
workers, especially if the greater stability of jobs among the former is taken into account.  
From this standpoint, legislation that discourages inter-sectoral movements of labour 
penalises job seekers from small-scale and informal sectors. 
 
Third, job creation in the modern sector emerged as a major problem in the post 
economic crisis era.  GDP growth slowed significantly, and most observers highlight the 
slow-down in investment, both domestic and international, as Indonesia’s key 
development problem (Hill, 2004).  As a consequence, whereas the share of output and 
employment in non-agricultural sectors, and wage employment rose quite rapidly before 
the economic ‘crisis’ of 1998, both slowed once Indonesia had regained economic 
stability after 1999 (see Table 2).  Even though unemployment did not rise much, wage 
employment outside agriculture declined by around 10% from 1996 through to 2003, 
after growing by some 50% and creating just under 60% of all new jobs created in the 
previous decade.19
 
A similar pattern was apparent in labour manufacturing. Before the crisis, wages and 
employment in the labour-intensive and export-oriented textile, clothing and footwear 
(TCF) industries (in which foreign investment played an important role), increased quite 
substantially and rose more quickly than in all industries (Table 4).  In short, although 
average wages were lower in labour-intensive compared with more capital-intensive 
activities, widespread repression of labour rights (see below) was not synonymous with 
                                                 
16  Although labour laws apply to all wage workers, in practice workers in most small and cottage 
establishments (some 60% of the total in the case of manufacturing and a higher share in other sectors) are 
outside the ambit of regulations.  See SMERU (2001) for a discussion of the coverage, in practice, of 
minimum wage legislation. 
17  Relatively high rates may be partly explained by a broader definition of unemployment in Indonesia.  
According to the official definition, a significant share of all unemployed workers (around 40% in 2002) 
consisted of ‘discouraged’ workers, who were not involved in job search activities. 
18  The table shows data for large and medium and small firms only, which accounted for around 60% of 
total manufacturing employment. 
19  Estimates based on data from the National Labour Force surveys, 1986-2003. 
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wage repression.  However, after the crisis, employment in the TCF industries barely 
increased, and real wages fell and remained below pre-crisis levels in 2001.  Thus the 
introduction of new labour legislation and institutions should be viewed in the context of 
a labour market under stress, and particularly a modern sector which has performed well 
below its potential in terms of creating new and better jobs for Indonesia’s large and 
growing population.20  
 
 
IV:  LABOUR REFORMS STAGE I: AFFIRMATION OF BASIC LABOUR RIGHTS 
 
The fall of President Soeharto in 1998 ushered in a new period for labour rights and 
standards in Indonesia.  Under Soeharto’s New Order, labour freedoms were tightly 
controlled, the above-mentioned increases in wages and employment notwithstanding 
(Hadiz, 1997; Manning, 1998).21  The rights of organised labour were kept under control 
through one official trade union (SPSI) that was closely aligned to the ruling party.  
Collective bargaining was encouraged in legislation, and strikes permitted by law 
(outside ‘essential industries), and the latter increased in periods of greater political 
openness and economic stress.  However the right to air grievances and participate in 
dispute resolution were limited.  In practice, labour complaints were dealt with harshly by 
local police and military, which were commonly on the payroll of the larger companies 
(Hadiz, 1997).  Labour disputes that were taken to local and central government Disputes 
Councils either dragged on for long periods, or were frequently settled in favour of 
employers through bribes to council members.  It was an open secret that labour 
inspectors and local officials were also on the payroll of private companies. 
 
With the downfall of President Soeharto in 1998, and the emergence of a more open 
democratic system, the government could no longer continue to publicly suppress labour 
rights.  As Indonesia experienced its worst economic crisis in three decades, political 
change permitted a freer trade union movement and several important labour reforms. 
 
First, the government ratified several key ILO Conventions, including rights to compete 
without discrimination and freedom of association.  Four conventions were signed in 
1998-2000, dealing with Basic Rights (minimum age of employment, worst forms of 
child labour, abolition of forced labour and freedom from discrimination).22  Ratification 
of the key ILO convention on the Freedom of Association (Convention No. 87), which 
provides for the right of workers to establish unions of their choosing, effectively ended 
the long period from 1973, some 25 years, in which workers could only join one, 
government sanctioned, trade union. 
 
                                                 
20  One favourable development, however, has been a slowdown in growth of the working age population, 
owing the age structure effects of past declines in fertility, which had begin to significantly affect the 
number of new entrants into the labour force by the year 2000.  
21  Although formal controls were relaxed somewhat in the last years of the regime when the government 
passed legislation permitting the formation of independent unions at enterprise level. 
22  The four conventions and their date of ratification by Indonesia were No. 138 (1999), No. 182 (2000), 
No. 105 (1999) and No 111 (1999) respectively.  Previously the government had ratified two conventions 
(No. 28 on forced labour (ratified in 1950) and No. 98 (1958) on the right organise and bargain collectively. 
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Second, more importantly, the right to organise was enshrined in law through the Trade 
Union Act in 2000, setting the minimum size of trade unions (10 members), conditions 
governing multiple unionism in single establishments, and rules for the formation union 
federations and confederations.  The Trade Union Act has contributed to a proliferation 
of unions across the country.  From just one trade union, a total of 61 federations were 
reported to be in place across the country and (according to official estimates) as many as 
10 million or more members from a total number of non-casual wage workers of some 26 
million in April 2001, 24 million outside agriculture, including 8 million in 
manufacturing (SMERU, 2002).  A study by a social research institute, SMERU, of 
industrial relations in major industrial areas in 2002 found that over half of all enterprise 
unions had been set up after 1997.  The study also found that the process of signing 
collective agreements had accelerated at enterprise level. 
 
For employers, this was a major change in the industrial relations framework.  Many 
were shocked by the ‘big bang’ nature of the reforms, doubting that firms would be able 
to deal with multiple unionism.  But in reality the opening up of the industrial relations 
system appears to have had little negative effect on employment and did not result in a 
significant increase in employer complaints.  Jobs and wages in large and medium scale 
firms which fell during the crisis, subsequently grew, albeit slowly, in the new industrial 
relations environment in the period 1998-2001 
 
However implementation of new legislation related to both Survival and Security 
Rights was another matter.  We argue that it was these reforms, much more than the 
reforms to basic rights, that have threatened to slow the expansion of employment in the 
modern sector.  We now turn to these reforms, giving special attention to minimum 
wages, new rates of severance and the employment of contract workers. 
 
 
V. LABOUR REFORM STAGE II: EXTENDING SURVIVAL AND SECURITY 
RIGHTS23
 
Before the crisis in 1998, governments had legislated for quite comprehensive set of 
labour standards covering both survival and Security Rights, most of which had been 
introduced through Basic Laws (Acts) in the 1950s and 1960s before Soeharto came to 
power.24  However, there were problems in ensuring that these were guaranteed even in 
the small modern sector, owing to shortcomings in the political, bureaucratic and 
institutional framework for implementation and supervision.  In part, this can be 
attributed to the above-mentioned tight formal and informal controls over the trade union 
movement which limited the capacity and right of appeal by workers in cases of disputes 
over standards.  By East Asian standards, the Labour Acts (some based on legislation in 
                                                 
23  Some of the material presented in this section overlaps with material discussed in Manning (2004: 238-
245). 
24  Most of the early labour protection legislation was passed shortly after independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, although limitation of several key rights (including the right to strike) were imposed even in this 
period as the ‘left’ leaning labour unions began to pose a political and economic challenge to the 
government during a period of economic decline. 
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force in Holland after World War II), were quite favourable to labour, providing for a 40 
hour week (compared with 48 hours in many other countries in the region until quite 
recently), generous overtime provisions, 12 days annual leave and two days menstruation 
leave.25  All dismissals and retrenchments had to be approved by Labour Disputes 
Councils. 
 
Following the passing of the Trade Union Bill in the year 2000, labour protection shifted 
to top priority on the labour reform agenda in the populist Wahid government (1999-
2001), and the subsequent government under Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004).  Ex-
union leaders appointed as Ministers of Manpower championed reform on the grounds 
that Indonesian workers had suffered in terms of both Survival and Security Rights in the 
past.  In particular, raising minimum wages and providing better protection for laid-off 
workers was viewed as essential, given that workers were seen to have suffered on both 
counts under Soeharto and during the Asian economic crisis.   
 
Although preceded by stand-alone regulations, the passing of the Manpower Protection 
Act in early 2003 embodied the new, more interventionist approach to labour standards.  
It covers almost every conceivable aspect of labour protection – manpower planning, 
employment of child, female and foreign workers, wages and condition of work, contract 
employment, dismissals, collective bargaining and settlement of grievances –  in large 
and small enterprises in some 18 chapters and nearly 200 articles.  The Act provided 
greater certainty for both business and labour.26  But at the same time, the basic law had 
the potential to undermine efforts at collective bargaining and the role of the newly 
empowered union movement, which was now in a much stronger position to bargain with 
employers than had been the case for several decades.  It also had the potential to break 
any nexus between productivity and labour standards, which might have been enhanced 
through collective bargaining in different firms, industries and regions. 
 
We now look at several examples of articles in relation to both survival and Security 
Rights in the Manpower Protection Act, and their potential impact on wages and 
employment. 
 
Survival Rights: Minimum Wages 
 
Minimum wages (MW) are regulated in the Act that provides for annual revisions to 
wages through Provincial Government Decrees, based on the recommendation of District 
Governments.27  The criteria for setting MW are to be based on a ‘decent’ or ‘suitable’ 
                                                 
25  The main laws were Act No. 14, 1969, Law No. 12, 1964.  See Manning (1998: Chapter 8) for details on 
labour law and rights under Soeharto, and Nayyar (1995) for some comparative data for East Asia. 
26  Although there remains considerable uncertainty, given that many issues were not sufficiently resolved 
in the legislation and depend on implementing legislation and machinery, which will take several years to 
put in place. 
27  The MW is to be set at either District or Provincial level for all industries and also according to specific 
sectors (see Articles 87-98 of the Manpower Protection Act of 2003). ‘Bipartite’ negotiations between 
employers and worker representatives or trade unions provide are required to make recommendations to the 
district governments. 
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standard of living (kehidupan layak), to defined in detail by subsequent regulations issued 
by the Ministry of Manpower.28
 
MW regulation had already been a key element in labour policy under Soeharto.  An 
index of minimum living needs (KHM – Kehidupan Hidup Minimum) had become the 
main basis for assessing minimum wages relative to the needs of workers, at the 
provincial level, before the crisis in 1996.29  However, even under Soeharto, the MW was 
never viewed as a social safety net for lower paid workers, as is commonly the case in 
many other countries.  Rather it was regarded as a standard for unskilled wages 
throughout the modern sector.  The absolute value of the KHM was high by most criteria 
of disadvantage in Indonesia (for example, it was more than twice the level of per capita 
poverty line in 2001), and included several items that were not regularly consumed by 
low income families.30  While minimum wages had remained well below average wages 
for much of the New Order period, SMERU (2001) found that were much closer to the 
prevailing wages of for majority of workers by 2000 and were "bunched" around the 
minimum wage.  Compliance with the minimum wage had steadily increased over time 
and the MW was ‘binding’ for the most workers in the formal, urban sector.  In 
comparison to wages outside the modern sector, the MW could not be described as a 
‘survival’ wage (Bambang Widiyanto, 2003). 
 
Related to the high level of the KHM, and through the efforts of an ostensibly pro-labour 
Ministry strongly in support of raising standards, the MW was increased steeply after the 
crisis.31  Even though employment conditions were difficult, the Central Government 
encouraged rapid minimum wage growth from 1999, resulting in a complete recovery in 
real rupiah terms by 2001 and significant growth in the major industrial areas in 2002, 
compared with the pre-crisis period (Figure 1).  In dollar terms, the minimum wage had 
recovered to pre-crisis levels, the large rupiah depreciation notwithstanding (Manning, 
2004).32  
 
What was the impact of rising minimum wages on employment?  Several researchers 
found a strong negative relationship between minimum wages and employment in the 
modern sector, especially affecting unskilled, less educated and female workers 
(SMERU, 2001).  The relationship was much stronger in the post crisis period (Bird and 
                                                 
28  The Act also stipulates that firms must set wage and salary scales according to level (golongan), job, 
years of service, education and competency, to be regulated further by the ministerial decree (Article 92). 
29  Five other overlapping criteria including the interests of business, were recommended by the Ministry of 
Manpower as relevant to recommending minimum wage increases at the provincial level.  However, clear 
guidelines were never established as to how information on these other criteria might be collected and 
applied. 
30 The KHM was calculated according to on regular estimates of the prices of a basket of 43 items.  
According to the Manpower Act, the basket of goods was to be expanded to provide a decent standard of 
living, which according to Ministry of Manpower calculations would raise the standard of basic needs by 
around 20% above prevailing absolute value of the KHM. 
31  It was used to restore wage levels after a substantial decline in real terms owing to high inflation (a close 
to 100% increase in the CPI) during the economic crisis in 1998. 
32  The new MW probably helped the recovery in the index of textile, clothing and footwear wages by 
2001, after they plummeted in 1998 (see Table 4 above). 
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Manning, 2002).33  As we have seen, the impact was partly hidden.  Labour was absorbed 
into the informal sector rather than resulting in higher unemployment rates in a country 
where there were no unemployment benefits.  Unemployment rates were not significantly 
affected, although they did rise in 2002.34   
 
Two other potential effects are also worth noting.  First, wage differentials by skill and 
years of experience were likely to be compressed, as firms reacted to steeply rising 
minimum wages and labour costs by narrowing the margins for skill and experience.  
Individuals were now likely to have less incentive to invest in human capital.  Second, a 
range of other labour costs tied to minimum wages were also likely to rise.  This was the 
case with severance pay to which we now turn. 
 
Security Rights I: Severance Pay 
 
As we have seen, the economic crisis created a major challenge for modern sector 
employment in Indonesia.  Manufacturing employment alone declined by over 10% and 
over a million wage jobs were also lost in other sectors outside agriculture in 1998.  
Although there was some subsequent recovery in employment, large numbers of both 
educated and less educated people lost their jobs in the modern sector, in an environment 
where there are no publicly funded unemployment benefits and few people had private 
unemployment insurance.  There was strong pressure on firms to give generous payouts 
to their workers and more severance than required by legislation, even though rates had 
already been increased substantially by government regulation several years earlier.  
 
Minimum rates of severance pay and long service pay have subsequently been regulated 
in detail in the Manpower Protection Act of 2003.  As in other countries, a distinction is 
made in the rights to severance depending on the cause of separation, and in rates of 
severance and long service payments: different coverage is mandated for quits and 
dismissals, and in the latter category for dismissals for economic reasons (including 
downsizing and bankruptcy), minor violations of company regulations or, lastly, major 
violations or offences (Table 5).  Unlike in many other countries where rates of severance 
are lower for dismissals due to economic cause, the maximum rates apply according to 
the new Act in Indonesia. 
 
Reflecting rates already raised several years earlier, in a controversial earlier Ministerial 
Decision, the new Manpower Act increased the rate of severance and long service pay by 
30-40%.35  Business had cause for concern.  It had initially protested strongly regarding 
                                                 
33   Several other studies have found little relationship between minimum wages and employment in the 
pre-crisis period when output and investment were growing rapidly, and minimum wages were not binding 
on the wages for most workers.  See Islam and Nazara (2000), and Alatas and Cameron (2001). 
34  National unemployment rates rose only very slightly during the crisis and remained stable at around 5% 
to 2001 (or around 8% according to the new definition employed in the national labour force surveys).  By 
2003, they risen to 10% according to the new definition. 
35  Although there were some important changes, mainly in response to lobbying from business, the rates of 
severance remain the same in the Manpower Act as in the Ministerial Decision of 2000 (Decision No. 150), 
and most articles in Ministerial Decision were incorporated in the Act. 
 14
increases in severance and long service pay in the year 2000.36  Comparative data reveal, 
moreover, that severance pay was now several times higher in Indonesia compared with 
most neighbouring countries.  The number of months of pay which firms had to give in 
severance for employees who were dismissed for economic cause was three to five times 
more than in China, India, Korea and Malaysia in 2003-4.37  The difference was smaller 
with Philippines and Thailand (1.5-2.5 times higher in Indonesia).  But absolute costs 
were probably as high or higher for firms in Indonesia than in both these countries, 
despite much higher wage rates in both the Philippines and Thailand. 
 
Aside from increasing the overall rate of severance by some 200% over the past 20 years 
(see Figure 2), and more than 50% for workers with longer years of service since 2000, 
these changes have had a twofold effect on the incentive structure with regard to 
severance. 
• First, it has raised the cost of dismissing workers with longer years of service (10 
years or more) relative to workers with fewer years of service.  The steeper lines 
for total severance (including payments for years of service, also regulated in the 
Act) according to the regulations in 2003 and 2000 compared with earlier years 
(1986 and 1996) shown in Figure 2 indicate this advantage accruing to more 
experienced workers. 
• Second, it has raised the total relative cost of dismissing workers for economic 
cause, precisely at a time when many firms were under pressure to lay of workers.  
Figure 2 demonstrates that severance pay for workers dismissed for economic 
cause had more than doubled for most years of service from 1986 to 2003, and 
nearly tripled for workers who had been employed with the same firm for 10 
years or more. 
 
Even though increases in severance and long service pay were much larger several years 
earlier, they were likely to have quite a significant effect on labour costs and hence 
employment in the post-crisis period.  Greater pressure for higher levels of compliance 
and slow growth in demand were particular problems.  This was especially true in larger 
labour-intensive establishments in competitive industries, such as garments and footwear, 
where profit margins are slender and job-hopping is common.  Further, the large recent 
minimum wage increases discussed above were one additional factor contributing to 
higher costs of severance.38  Thus for example, the costs of dismissal for economic cause 
of a worker, earning the minimum wage and with ten years experience, in Jakarta was 
approximately Rp. 3.4 million in 2000 (around US$400) prior to issue of the Ministerial 
Decree in 2000.  The cost rose to just over Rp. 5 million after the decree was issued in the 
same year.  But it had ballooned to Rp. 13 million ($1450) by the time that the Manpower 
Protection Act was passed in 2003 for the same category of worker, with the increase 
being wholly due to the rise in minimum wages. 
                                                 
36  Larger changes introduced in 1996 (Ministerial Decree No. 3, 1996) caused less of a stir when the 
economy was still booming, dismissals for economic cause were rarer, and compliance was low. 
37  See Hill (2004), citing data compiled by Dr. Kelly Bird (USAID) in Jakarta. 
38  Severance is calculated as a multiple of monthly salary at the time of dismissal, depending on years of 
service 
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In short, the reforms act as a tax on employment and discourage firms from dismissing 
older workers.  Further, they are likely to encourage industrial disputes.  Neither 
employers nor employees are required to 'invest' in severance pay up front, and hence 
firms are often not in a position to pay severance at times of unexpected difficulty.  
Higher rates of severance pay are likely to compound the effects of higher minimum 
wages by encouraging firms to employ fewer permanent workers.  It is would be hardly 
surprising if many prefer out-sourcing jobs or other forms of temporary contract.  
However, this too has been another area where the Manpower Protection Act would seem 
to be heavily penalising new job seekers. 
 
Security Rights 2: The Employment of Contract Workers 
 
One strategy for conserving labour costs in light of higher severance pay rates (especially 
for workers with longer periods of service) is the substitution of regular employees on 
permanent contracts for workers on fixed term contracts. Another possibility is greater 
outsourcing of activities, especially where production tends to fluctuate owing to seasonal 
work or unpredictable variations in demand, such as variations in orders from domestic 
and overseas buyers.   
 
However, the Indonesian government has also sought to regulate contract work and out-
sourcing, at the same time as it has increased the rates of severance pay.  With regard to 
fixed term contracts, the Manpower Protection Act permits contract work for one-off 
production activities, production runs which extend for no longer than three years, 
seasonal work and work associated with the introduction of new products which are still 
of a temporary or experimental nature (see Clause 59).39  Such activities are only 
permissible for up to three years (two years initially, plus one year extension) initially, 
and for a further two years under a new contract.  The Act limits labour outsourcing to 
‘non-core’ activities (that are outside the production process), which support the company 
“as a whole” and do not inhibit production processes. Typical examples are service 
activities such as cleaning, catering or security (Article 64). 
 
The provisions in the Manpower Protection Act are not overly restrictive compared with 
regulations in many other developing and developed countries.  Limitations on fixed-term 
contract work are consistent with modern labour codes, although they are likely to 
exacerbate problems for modern sector firms under difficult labour market conditions, 
such as those experienced by Indonesia in the post-crisis period. 
 
The attempted regulation of outsourcing is probably more serious for employment. In 
practice, the limitations on outsourcing seek to remove putting-out activities to 
households or companies, which may be called on by a company to produce extra output 
at times of peak demand, such as regularly occurs in industries like garments. Sub-
contracting to households typically occurs for low-quality products produced for local 
markets or for export, especially if there are marked seasonal changes or shocks in 
                                                 
39  See also Ministry of Manpower, Ministerial Decision No. 100 2004. 
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demand and supply conditions.  Outsourcing of parts of the production chain which are 
part of core activities is now an established aspect of production in global markets, 
especially in industries like electronics.   
 
Further, it is questionable whether introduction of bans on outsourcing improves the 
welfare of poorer households. In particular, such regulations discriminate against those 
who are less able to perform jobs on a fixed working schedule or in shift-work, especially 
older workers and married females. Community policing and solutions rather than 
straight out bans may be a more equitable outcome.40
 
More generally, the limitations on contract work and the outsourcing of core activities, 
usually to smaller firms on a seasonal basis, can also affect employment adversely 
precisely in industries like textiles, where flexibility in output and employment is critical 
for international competitiveness.  The capacity of many large companies to meet the 
demands of foreign and sometimes domestic buyers at times of peak demand depends 
crucially on such arrangements in labour-intensive industries like textiles, clothing and 
footwear.41 It can be argued that strict limitations on such activities (if they could be 
enforced) would be a setback for Indonesia, bearing in mind that breaking up, the 
production process within (and across) countries through intra-industry trade has been a 
major factor in export growth and employment in East Asia from the latter part of the 20th 
century (Athukorala, 2004).  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the short space of some six years since the economic crisis in Indonesia in 1998, there 
has been a major rewriting of Indonesia’s labour code in the fields of industrial relations 
and labour protection, after little serious reform for almost 30 years.  Labour policy has 
been transformed, both with respect to Basic and Civic (‘Core’) labour rights, as well as 
Survival and Security Rights.  The former were tightly controlled during the New Order 
period under Soeharto.  The latter were regulated quite extensively, but sanctions for non-
compliance were low and breaches of the laws were commonplace. 
 
At the same time as labour policy has stressed rights and standards, government 
statements (and those of all political parties and presidential candidates in 2004) 
repeatedly emphasized employment creation as one of Indonesia’s most important 
challenges.42  However, few government leaders and political spokespersons have 
acknowledged the potential for conflict between achieving employment goals – creating 
better jobs – and tightly regulating Survival and Security Rights in the reformasi era in 
                                                 
40 Of course, some of the most important solutions often lie well beyond the scope of labour standards, such 
as incentives and support for the education of poor children unable to attend school. 
41 Much hinges on the definition of ‘core’ activities which is likely to be subjective, especially in 
components industries like electronics. 
42  For example, the new President cited unemployment as foremost amongst the social challenges faced by 
the country and employment creation as a major goal of the new government, in his Inauguration Speech of 
October 20, 2004 (“Our economic growth this year, which is still below 7 percent, is definitely inadequate 
in stimulating employment”, Jakarta Post, October 21, 2004). 
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Indonesia.  Nor has there been serious discussion of an alternative strategy of setting 
minimum standards, and allowing firms and workers to bargain over most standards, 
according to industry and firm circumstances.43  In short, in contrast to the pluralism in 
post-New Order government policy with regard to many other dimensions of public life, 
Survival and Security Rights have been regulated by government decree in extraordinary 
detail, ostensibly in favour of workers whose formal protection was seen as neglected 
during the Soeharto era.  We have argued that the regulations are only likely to protect 
the interests of employed workers in the ‘protected’ modern sector, in practice, to the 
exclusion of rights of those in the informal sector and agriculture.  The latter are only 
marginally, if at all, protected by some clauses in the legislation.  To the extent that the 
legislation penalizes employment growth, as some research and a priori reasoning 
suggests, it penalizes many of these poorer workers, and also younger, new job seekers 
who seek ‘better’ modern sector jobs.  
 
Thus, a consistent policy framework is vital to reconcile incentives for job creation by 
private enterprise with the need to provide basic social protection for workers.  In 
particular, there has been little public discussion on the implications for employment of a 
raft of clauses which regulate rights in the Manpower Protection Act No. 13, 2003, the 
most important national policy document for labour standards. 
 
This Chapter has examined some of these relationships with special reference to Survival 
Rights embodied in minimum wage policy, and Security Rights regulated in the clauses 
in the Act on dismissals and severance pay, contract workers and out-sourcing.  We have 
discussed the effects of regulation in both areas in the context of much more difficult 
labour market conditions in Indonesia since 1998, compared with the Soeharto period.  
The Chapter also notes the importance of the compliance regime in assessing the impact 
of regulations on Survival and Security Rights.  Before the economic crisis, ‘compliance 
costs’ were low because employers could ‘arrange’ settlements in their favour, faced with 
a weak and tightly controlled labour movement.  Employment was determined largely by 
labour demand associated with the rate of economic growth, and the volume and quality 
of labour supply.  With a significant improvement in Basic and Civil Rights, the 
compliance regime in relation to labour standards has altered dramatically, with the 
recognition of freedoms of association, together with liberal policies on the formation of 
trade unions. The comprehensive revision of the labour protection regime and its 
implications for job creation, need to be viewed in this context. 
 
In short, assuming a downward sloping demand curve for labour and (relatively) 
competitive product markets in tradable goods industries, we have argued that several 
dimensions of government policy will to contribute to slower modern sector employment 
growth, and less labour market flexibility.  The latter is of concern especially in those 
internationally labour-intensive industries such as TCF, where Indonesia has had a 
comparative advantage in the past, and in light of the more competitive international 
environment, in the post-crisis and recovery period in Indonesia. 
                                                 
43  One important exception is the National Planning Bureau (Bappenas) White Paper on Employment 
published in 2003. 
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Figure 1: Real Minimum Wages in Major Industrial Centres and 
All Indonesia, 1992-2002 (Rp. 000 per month, 1996 prices)
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Source: Indonesia, Ministry of Manpower, unpublished data, various years. 
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 Figure 2: Legally Payable Severance, Number of Months Pay by Years  of Service,  Indonesia 1986-
2003
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Source:  Indonesia, Ministry of Manpower, Ministerial Regulation No. 4 1986, Ministerial Decrees No. 3, 1996 
and 150, 2000, and the Manpower Protection Act, (Act No. 13, 2003). 
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Table 1:  A Classification of Labour Standards as Rights 
 
TYPE OF STANDARD/RIGHT DESCRIPTION 
Basic Rights Right against involuntary servitude/forced labour 
 Right against physical coercion 
 Right against discrimination 
 Right against (exploitative use of) child labour 
  
Civic Rights Right to free association 
 Right to collective representation 
 Right to free expression of grievances 
  
‘Survival’ Rights Right to a living wage 
 Right to full information about work place hazards 
 Right to accident compensation 
 Right to limited hours of work 
  
Security Rights Right against arbitrary dismissal 
 Right to severance and long service pay 
 Right to retirement compensation 
 Right to survivor’s compensation 
 
Source: Adapted from Singh (2003), page 111 
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Table 2: The Structure of Indonesian GDP and Employment and Output 
per Workers, 1986-2002 
 
 1986 1996 1998 2000 2002 
      
Share of GDP      
Agriculture 24.6 16.5 18.0 17.7 16.9 
Industry 35.5 43.0 42.7 43.6 43.6 
  Manufacturing  17.9 25.0 25.6 26.7 27.0 
Services 40.0 40.6 39.3 38.7 39.4 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      
Share of Employment      
Agriculture 55.1 44.0 45.1 44.3 44.3 
Manufacturing 8.2 12.6 13.0 13.2 13.2 
Services 36.7 43.4 41.9 42.4 42.4 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      
Wage employees 45.8 50.0 48.9 49.2 47.9 
Non-wage employees 54.2 50.0 51.1 50.8 52.1 
      
Output per worker (Rp. Million)*     
Agriculture 1.5 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 
Manufacturing 7.5 11.3 11.5 10.8 11.2 
Other** 5.4 7.7 6.6 7.0 7.3 
Total** 3.4 5.7 5.1 5.2 5.5 
 
*  At constant 1995 prices. Includes services and other industry 
**  Includes all services, mining, utilities and construction 
 
Source: National Accounts and National Labour Force Surveys (various 
years)
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Table 3: Employment, Wages and Value Added in Large & Medium and Small Firms in Indonesian Manufacturing, 1995-2002 
 
  
No. of 
Firms 
 
Employment 
 
 
Wage 
Costs 
 
Value 
Added 
 
Average 
Wage 
 
Value Added 
per Worker 
 
Ratio of Wages 
to Value Added 
 
Ratio of Small to 
L&M firm wages 
per worker 
    000 (Rp. b.) (Rp. b.)     
      
(Rp.m./wkr) (Rp.m.)  
Large&Medium   
1995 21551       
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
4174 13627 73909 3.26 17.71 0.18 0.29 
1996 22997 4215 15752 93332 3.74 22.14 0.17 0.24 
1997 22386 4170 18642 100900 4.47 24.20 0.18 0.19 
1998 21423 4124 28642 154651 6.95 37.50 0.19 0.23 
1999 22070 4234 30438 191393 7.19 45.20 0.16 0.25 
2000 22851 4371 36085 222112 8.26 50.81 0.16 0.19 
 
Small  
1995 190767 1598 1498 3888 0.94 2.43 0.39  
1996 228978 1915 1715 4612 0.90 2.41 0.37  
1997 241169 2077 1774 4802 0.85 2.31 0.37  
1998 194564 1507 2420 6923 1.61 4.59 0.35  
1999 225564 1779 3240 8182 1.82 4.60 0.40  
2000 256823 2005 3127 8380 1.56 4.18 0.37  
                 
 
 
Source: BPS-Indonesian Statistics, Indonesian Statistical Yearbook, various year (data from the Annual Survey of Large and Medium 
Manufacturing, and periodic surveys of small scale industry)  
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Table 4:  Growth of Employment, Value Added and Wages in TCF, and 
All Industries 1986-2001  (% per annum) 
 
  Textiles, Clothing All Industries 
  & Footwear  
Employment   
1986-1991 16.9 11.4 
1991-1996 8.0 6.8 
1996-2001 1.0 0.7 
   
Value Added   
1986-1991 24.1 29.8 
1991-1996 25.3 16.2 
1996-2001 22.1 21.7 
   
Real wages   
Growth   
1986-1991 5.3 4.6 
1991-1996 5.3 3.5 
1996-2001 -2.1 -1.3 
  
Index (1996=100)  
1986 59 67 
1996 100 100 
1998 70 70 
2001 90 94 
 
Source:  Source:  CBS, Statistical Yearbook, 2001 (data from Survey of 
Large and Medium Manufacturing, various years).  Real Wages are 
calculated by deflating average nominal wages by the national CPI Index. 
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Table 5:  Months of Severance and Long Service Pay, According the Cause of 
Separation, Indonesia 2003 
 
 Basic Cause of Separation 
 Rates 
Economic 
Cause 
Bankruptcy
 
Retirement/Death/
Illness* 
Change of Firm 
Status 
Dismissal 
 
Voluntary 
Quit 
     Dismissed Quits  
Minor 
Offense 
Major 
Offense  
  Months of Pay 
Severance Pay          
Less than one year 
service 1mth. 2  2  2  2  1 1 0 0 
Three years service 4mth. 8  8  8  8  4 4 0 0 
Five years service 6mth. 12  12  12  12  6 6 0 0 
Ten years service 9mth. 18 18 18 18 9 9 0 0 
Twenty years service 9mth. 18 18 18 18 9 9 0 0 
Maximum 9mth. 18 18 18 18 9 9 0 0 
          
Long Service Leave          
Less than one year 
service 0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 
Three years service 2mth. 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 
Five years service 2mth. 2  2  2  2  2 2 0 0 
Ten years service 4mth. 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 
Twenty years service 7mth. 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 0 
Maximum 10mth 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 
          
Total Severance          
Less than one year 
service  2  2  2  2  1 1 0 0 
Three years service  10 10 10 10 6 6 0 0 
Five years service  14 14 14 14 8 8 0 0 
Ten years service  22 22 22 22 13 13 0 0 
Twenty years service  25 25 25 25 16 16 0 0 
Maximum  28 28 28 28 19 19 0 0 
 
* In lieu of a company financed pension scheme.  Prolonged illness for 12 months or 
more. 
 
Source: The Manpower Protection Act No. 13 2003, Clauses 156-167 
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